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Abstract
The individual self comprise unique attributes, the relational self comprises partner-shared
attributes, and the collective self comprises ingroup-shared attributes. All selves are fundamental
components of the self-concept, with each being important and meaningful to human experience
and with each being associated with health benefits. Are the selves, however, equally important
and meaningful? We review a program of research that tested four competing theoretical views
suggesting that the motivational hub of human experience is (a) the individual self, (b) the
relational self, (b) the collective self, or (c) determined by contextual or cultural factors. The
research furnished support to the view that the individual self is the primary form of selfdefinition. We discuss alternative explanations and implications. We end with the introduction
of a theoretical model, the boomerang model, that has the potential to integrate the diverse
literature on the topic.
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Individual Self, Relational Self, Collective Self:
Hierarchical Ordering of the Tripartite Self
The self-concept is not a singular, monolithic cognitive structure. Instead, it comprises
three fundamental components: the individual self, relational self, and collective self (Sedikides
& Brewer, 2001). This is to say that people pursue and achieve self-definition in terms of their
personal, relational, or group characteristics. Are the three selves equally indispensible to the
individual? Is one more primary than the others? Does it all depend on context and culture?
These are the issues we address in the present article.
The Three Selves
The individual self highlights one’s unique side. It consists of attributes (e.g., traits, goals
and aspirations, experiences, interests, behaviors) that differentiate the person from others. This
self-representation is relatively independent of relational bonds or group memberships. The
relational self, on the other hand, highlights one’s interpersonal side. It consists of attributes that
are shared with close others (e.g., partners, friends, family members) and define roles within the
relationship. This self-representation reflects valued interpersonal attachments. Finally, the
collective self highlights one’s intergroup side. It consists of attributes that are shared with
ingroup members and differentiate the ingroup from outgroups. This self-representation reflects
membership in valued social groups.
The three selves co-exist, such that persons can alternate between perceiving the self as a
distinct individual, as a relational partner, or as an interchangeable group member (Sedikides &
Brewer, 2001a,b). In addition, each self is associated with psychological and physical health
benefits, and each self is important and meaningful to human experience (Berkman, LeoSummers, & Horwitz, 1992; Correll & Park, 2005; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Gable, Reis, Impett, &
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Asher, 2004; Hardie, Kashima, & Pridemore, 2005; Haslam, Jetten, Postmes, & Haslam, 2009;
Hawkley, Browne, & Cacioppo, 2005; Myers & Diener, 1995; Sheldon & Filak, 2008; Taylor,
Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003a,b; Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996).
However, the selves may not be equally important and meaningful. The selves may have
different motivational utility. If so, which self is primary?
Theoretical Views on Motivational Self-Primacy
Individual-Self Primacy
This view asserts the primacy of the individual self. The core attributes of this selfrepresentation are positive and important, influence the processing of subsequent information,
and are resistant to unfavorable feedback but welcoming of favorable feedback (Markus, 1977;
Sedikides, 1993). Indeed, persons are motivated to maintain or elevate their self-image and to
protect against possible deflation of their self-image. For example, persons regard themselves as
better than the average other, claim credit for a dyadic or group success while displacing blame
to others, derogate conveyors of unfavorable feedback, and, when they cannot negate such
feedback, recall it poorly or devalue the feedback dimension (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Brown,
1998; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003; Shepperd, Malone, & Sweeny, 2008). In all, existing literature
is consistent with the possibility that the motivational hub of the self-concept is the individual
self.
Relational-Self Primacy
This view asserts the primacy of the relational self. Persons manifest a paramount desire
for formation of stable interpersonal attachments, enhance and protect their relationships, resist
the termination of existing relationships, and feel psychological and physical pain when socially
excluded (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; Murray,
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Holmes, & Griffin, 1996). In addition, close relationships influence perceptions, affective
reactions, and behaviors toward new acquaintances, as well as goal pursuit (Andersen & Chen,
2002; Sedikides, Olsen, & Reis, 1993; Tice & Baumeister, 2001). In all, the existing literature is
consistent with the possibility that the motivational hub of the self-concept is the relational self.
Collective-Self Primacy
This view asserts the primacy of the collective self. Persons are profoundly influenced
by their social groups in terms of conformity and belief polarization (Asch, 1951; Myers &
Lamm, 1976). In addition, persons are motivated to elevate and protect a positive group image,
as they manifest favorable perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors toward their ingroup members
(Boldry & Gaertner, 2006; Brewer 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Finally, the collective self may
accord the optimal level of self-definition by simultaneously meeting competing needs for
assimilation through intergroup comparisons and differentiation through intragroup comparisons,
respectively (Brewer & Roccas, 2001). In all, existing literatures is consistent with the
possibility that the motivational hub of the self-concept is the collective self.
Contextual Primacy
This view asserts the primacy of the contextual self. Neither the individual nor the
relational or collective self is inherently primary. Rather, the relative primacy of these selves
depends on contextual factors the influence their accessibility. Indeed, research on the working
self-concept (Markus & Wurf, 1987), symbolic interactionism or role theory (Stryker & Statham,
1985), and the kaleidoscopic self (Deaux & Perkins, 2001) demonstrates shifts in self-definition
as a function of norm salience, role importance, or fleeting social circumstances, respectively. In
addition, research on self-categorization theory (Onorato & Turner, 2004; Turner, Oakes,
Haslam, & McGarty, 1994) suggests that self-definition fluctuates between the individual and
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collective self as a function of contextual features, with the collective self becoming salient in
intergroup contexts and the individual self becoming salient in intragroup contexts. In all, the
literature is consistent with the possibility that the motivational hub of the self-concept is the self
rendered momentarily accessible by the vagaries of the social context.
Comparative Testing
All four theoretical views are plausible and all can boast selective evidence in their favor.
But to avoid impasses familiar to philosophical debates, the literature needs to move forward
through comparative testing (Platt, 1964). Which of these four views best accounts for
motivational primacy in self-definition? We initiated a program of research to address this
question.
As stated above, persons are motivated to enhance or protect all three selves. We used
this motivational tendency as a medium, a metaphorical microscope of sorts, in our attempts to
test for motivational primacy. In particular, we compared the relative functioning of the three
selves in the face of threat (e.g., negative feedback) or flattery (e.g., favorable feedback) under
the rationale that the self that serves as the motivational hub of human experience will react more
strongly to events that either weaken or bolster its integrity. The motivationally primary self is
the self that more strongly avoids or rejects threat and more strongly approaches or endorses
flattery.
We carried out multiple studies, each with its own methodological nuances, in an effort to
meet methodological considerations for effective and diagnostic hypothesis testing. We
introduced various controls over variables that could compromise comparative testing. For
example, across studies, we implemented different procedures for controlling the accessibility of
the selves, enacted various forms of threat or flattery, measured a variety of reactions to threat or
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flattery, sampled an assortment of collective selves, and assessed the independent reaction of
each self. Below, we provide representative empirical examples.
Relative Primacy of Individual Self, Collective Self, and Contextual Self
Self accessibility. In our first study (Gaertner, Sedikides, Graetz, 1999, Experiment 1),
we tested female students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH). We
ventured to activate both the individual and collective self (i.e., UNC women). We activated the
individual self by highlighting participants’ “unique background, personality traits, skills,
abilities, and hobbies.” We activated the collective self by stating that participants were “female
and you share membership in the group UNC women.” All participants, then, completed a fake
personality test and received fabricated feedback that was either threatening (“moody”) or
flattering (“emotionally expressive”). Importantly, the feedback pertained either to the
individual self (e.g., you are moody vs. emotionally expressive) or the collective self (e.g., UNC
women – excluding you – are moody vs. emotionally expressive). Subsequently, participants
were offered the opportunity to define themselves in accordance with either their individual self
(“I am a unique individual,” “My personality attributes are totally unique,” “My beliefs and
values are totally unique”) or their collective self (“I am very similar to UNC women,” My
personality attributes are quite similar to the attributes of UNC women,” “My beliefs and values
are quite similar to the beliefs and values of UNC women”).
Participants could buffer themselves from the threatening feedback by escaping (i.e.,
shifting away) from the threatened self. According to the individual-self primacy view,
threatening feedback to the individual self would be more impactful than threatening feedback to
the collective self; hence, participants would shift to the collective self to buffer a threat to the
individual self. According to the collective self-primacy view threatening feedback to the
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collective self would be more impactful than threatening feedback to the individual self; hence,
participants would shift to the individual self to buffer a threat to the collective self. Finally,
according to the contextual primacy view, when both selves are made accessible, threatening
feedback to the individual self will be as impactful as for the collective self; hence, participants
would be equally likely to shift to the collective self when the individual self is threatened, and to
shift to the individual self when the collective self is threatened. The results were consistent with
the individual-self primacy view. Participants more strongly deemphasized their uniqueness and
increased identification with their ingroup when they received threatening feedback about the
individual self.
Ingroup identification. These findings may be limited to low group identifiers. Could it
be that threatening feedback to the collective self is more impactful for high than low group
identifiers (Branscombe & Wann, 1991; Spears, Doojse, & Ellemers, 1997; Voci, 2006)? In a
follow-up study (Gaertner et al., 1999, Experiment 2), we first assessed strength of identification
with the group (UNC-CH). Then, we asked participants to complete an ostensibly valid
creativity test and provided them with bogus and threatening performance feedback about either
the individual self (“you scored at the 31st percentile”) or the collective self (“UNC-CH students
– excluding you – scored at the 31st percentile.”) Finally, we recorded participants’ feelings
(e.g., sadness, anger).
Participants would experience bad mood following the feedback and would manage their
mood by strategically lowering the personal importance of creativity (i.e., feedback derogation;
Wyer & Frey, 1983). According to the individual-self primacy view, negative mood and
feedback derogation would be worse following threat to the individual self than collective self
regardless of strength of group identification. According to the collective-self primacy view,
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negative mood and feedback derogation would be worse following threat to the collective than
individual self regardless of strength of group identification. Finally, according to the contextual
primacy view, mood and feedback derogation would depend on strength of group identification:
low group identifiers would manifest an individual-self primacy pattern, whereas high identifiers
would manifest a collective-self primacy pattern. Again, the results were consistent with the
individual-self primacy view. Regardless of strength of group identification, participants
experienced a more negative mood and derogated the feedback to a greater degree (i.e., rated
creativity as less important), when the threatening feedback pertained to the individual self.
Idiographically important group. Are the above results patterns obtained when
participants choose their own group (idiographic selection) than when the researcher chooses it
for them (nomothetic selection)? In another study (O’Mara, Gaertner, & Wayment, 2007), we
adopted an idiographic approach. Some participants selected their own group—in fact, the most
important group to which they belonged—and proceeded to describe it (collective-self
condition). Other participants described what makes them a unique person (individual-self
condition). Then, all participants read a story ostensibly written by a recent university graduate
who faced difficulties finding employment and life fulfillment. Finally, participants wrote a
narrative stating what could cause either a member of their most important group (collective-self
condition) or themselves (individual-self condition) to have a negative experience similar to the
student’s. The narratives were coded for the degree to which the negative events befell the
targeted self.
Participants could engage in a strategic self-protection move (Sedikides & Green, 2000;
Sedikides & Strube, 1997). They could disincline from face future threat and thus write an offtopic response. They could bypass the potential threat of future negative events by disregarding
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the request to describe how such negativity could occur. According to the individual-self
primacy view, future negative events would be more threatening for the individual than
collective self; hence, participants would ignore future threat to the individual self. According to
the collective-self primacy view, future negative events would be more threatening for the
collective than individual self; hence, participants would ignore future threat to the collective
self. Finally, according to the contextual primacy view, negative future events would be equally
threatening to the two selves; hence, participants would be equally likely to ignore future threat
to either self. The results were, once again, consistent with the individual-self primacy view.
Most participants (93%) were willing to write about how a future negative event could befall
another member of their group. However, far fewer participants (60%) were willing to write
about how the same future negative event could befall them personally.
A meta-analysis. We wondered whether the results generalized beyond the observed
data to a population of possible studies that differed in procedural characteristics. We also
intended to expand the scope of our research by testing meta-analytically whether the selves
respond differentially not only to threat but also to flattery. Through literature searches, we
arrived at a set of 37 studies that varied in terms of the threat or flattery they used, the types of
reactions they assessed, and the groups that represented the collective self. To pay full justice to
the collective self and contextual self views, we coded studies in reference to two contextual
variables. The first involved strength of group identification. A group is a more accessible
basis of the collective self for high than low identifiers. The second variable involved whether
the group on which the collective self was based was laboratory-formed or natural. Such groups
differ in several ways (e.g., member commitment, member investment; Ostrom & Sedikides,
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1992). The result is that natural groups are a more readily accessible basis of collective self than
laboratory-formed groups.
According to the individual-self primacy view, participants react more strongly to both
threat and flattery of the individual than collective self. According to the collective-self primacy
view, participants react more strongly to both threat and flattery of the collective than individual
self. Finally, according to the contextual-primacy view, it all depends on group identification
and type of group. Low identifiers and studies using laboratory groups will manifest individualself primacy patterns, whereas high identifiers and studies using natural groups will manifest
collective-self primacy patterns. The results were consistent with the individual-self primacy
view. Participants responded more strongly when their individual than collective self was
threatened or flattered. These responses occurred for both low and high group identifiers, and
for both laboratory and natural groups.
Summary. We applied particular care in order to control or manipulate factors that
could yield misleading conclusions. In particular, we (a) integrated various aspects of threat
such as varying its type (e.g., received vs. future), controlling the feedback dimension, and
controlling feedback importance; (b) assessed a variety of reactions such as strategic selfshifting, mood state, feedback derogation, anger, and (un)willingness to face a future threat; (c)
used a variety of groups to represent the collective self such as groups that are ascribed (e.g.,
gender), achieved (e.g., university affiliation), and idiographically designated as most important;
(d) threatened the selves independently and assessed their independent responses; and (e)
recorded meta-analytically responses not only to threat but also to flattery. The findings attested
to the motivational primacy of the individual self versus the collective or contextual selves.
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These findings are consistent with relevant literature. Participants evaluate the individual
self more positively than the ingroup (Lindeman, 1997), regard the individual self more capable
than the ingroup of resisting media propaganda (Duck, Hogg, & Terry, 1995), and take personal
responsibility for the successes of the ingroup while blaming it for its failures (Mullen &
Riordan, 1988). Participants accentuate intragroup differences more than they accentuate
intragroup similarities (Simon, Pantaleo, & Mummendey, 1995), a pattern that attests to
individual self’s strivings for uniqueness. Group members disengage from successful ingroups
when intragroup comparisons threaten the individual self (Seta & Seta, 1996), whereas
employees decide on staying or leaving their companies on the basis of personal gain (e.g.,
resources, satisfaction, promotion opportunities) rather than corporate identification (Rusbult,
Farrell, Rogers, & Mainous, 1988). Finally, persons allocate more resources (i.e., money) to the
ingroup than the outgroup only when they are likely to maximize their own earnings via this
ingroup favoritism (Gaertner & Insko, 2000).
Relative Primacy of Individual Self, Relational Self, Collective Self, and Contextual
(Cultural) Self
The relational self. Where does the relational self fit in the motivationally hierarchy?
As the literature review that we presented in the first part of this article illustrates, the relational
self has as much at stake in topping the motivational hierarchy as any other self (Baumeister &
Leary, 1995; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996; Tice & Baumeister, 2001). At the very least, the
relational self may be more primary than the collective self. We conducted three studies to
address this issue (Gaertner et al., 2010).
Goals. Motivational primacy is manifested not only in reactions to feedback but also in
proactive functioning such as the construction of goals and ideals (Carver & Scheier, 2002;

Hierarchy of the Tripartite Self 13
Elliott & Dweck, 1988). Persons pursue goals pertinent to their individual, relational, and
collective selves (Gore & Cross, 2006; Sheldon & Houser, 2001). Such goals, when achieved,
contribute to subjective well-being (Emmons, 1986; King, Richards, & Stemmerich, 1998) and,
when thwarted, produce deeply unpleasant feeling states (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Higgins,
1987). Even imagining successful goal completion elevates subjective well-being and improves
physical health five months into the future (King, 2001). In our motivational primacy research
(Gaertner et al., 2010), we explored whether the selves are associated differentially with life
goals.
Culture (or context). What is the role of culture in the motivational primacy debate?
The cultural-self perspective (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989), which is generally
compatible with the contextual self approach, suggests that the cognitive, emotional, and
motivational elements of the self-system are forged by culture, and in particular by internalized
cultural norms. Norms in Western culture (e.g., USA, Canada, Northern and Western Europe,
Australia) underscore agency, uniqueness, and personal success, giving way to an independent
(i.e., separate, individualistic) self-system. However, norms in Eastern culture (e.g., East Asia,
Latin America, India, Middle East) underscore communality, connectedness, and the importance
of others, giving way to an interdependent (i.e., connected, collectivistic) self-system. (For more
nuanced perspectives, see: Dubois & Beauvois, 2005; Oyserman & Lee, 2008). It follows that
motivational primacy will fluctuate with culture. According to the cultural-self perspective, the
individual self will be on top of the hierarchy in the West but at the bottom of the hierarchy in
the East. Instead, the relational and collective selves will have primacy in the East.
The findings, however, appear to favor a universalist-self perspective. In self-description
tasks, participants write a higher proportion of individual-self aspects than collective-self
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aspects. That pattern replicates across (a) participants both with an independent and
interdependent self-construal (Gaertner et al., 1999, Investigation 4), (b) Chinese and American
or Canadian participants (Ross, Xun, & Wilson, 2002; Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991),
Philippino, Mexican, Australian, and American participants (del Prado et al., 2007), and (c)
experimenter-activated priming of individual and collective self (Trafimow et al., 1991; Ybarra
& Trafimow, 1998, Experiment 3). Moreover, at the implicit level, participants from the US,
China, and Japan evaluate the individual self more positively than the relational friend (i.e., best
friend) or the collective self (i.e., ingroup member) (Yamaguchi et al., 2007). We (Gaertner et
al., 2010) proceeded to test more directly whether culture moderates motivational primacy.
The evidence. In Study 1, we used an idiographic paradigm that allowed participants to
represent their relational and collective selves with whichever interpersonal relationship or social
group they deemed appropriate. We first rendered the three selves accessible by supplying
participants with detailed definitions of each self. Then, we assessed participants’ reactions to
the imagined loss of the activated self (i.e., individual, relational, or collective): what the
emotional impact of the loss would be, whether participants could be the same person following
the loss, whether their life would be meaningless following the loss, and whether they would
experience more intense negative or positive emotions as a results of the loss. Finally, we
assessed which self participants regarded their true or real self.
Participants manifested stronger reactions (i.e., larger effect on life, less positive mood,
more negative mood) to the imagined loss of the individual than the collective self (thus
replicating conceptually our past research), and to the imagined loss of the relational than
collective self. Also, the majority of participants regarded as more true or real their individual
than collective self, and their relational than collective self. But how about the comparison
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between the individual and the relational self? Participants expected the loss of the individual
self to impact more severely on their life than the loss of the relational self, and they also
regarded as more true or real their individual self than collective self. However, participants
reported an equally intense mood at the loss of the individual and relational selves. In all, the
findings point preliminarily to a three-tiered motivational hierarchy among selves, with the
individual self at the top of the hierarchy, followed by the relational self, and trailed by the
collective self.
In Study 2, we engaged in another test of the motivational hierarchy using different
methodology. First, we activated either the individual, relational, or collective self by supplying
participants with relevant and detailed definitions. Then, we assessed threat avoidance by
examining whether participants complied with instructions to describe how negative events
could befall that self (as in O’Mara et al., 2007). Participants were more likely to avoid a threat
to the individual self than either to the relational or the collective self. However, participants
exhibited only a weak tendency to avoid threat to the relational than collective self. The findings
were generally congruent with the three-tier motivational primacy model in which the individual
self is at the top. Yet, given the weakness of the relational-to-collective self comparison, and
given our goal to find out if the findings are qualified by culture, we carried out another study
involving a different methodology.
Study 3 assessed the relative proactive capacity of each self. Do the three selves
contribute differentially to life goals? The self-accessibility task came first. Participants from
China and the US described themselves in terms of one of the three selves. Next, they listed
their future goals, rated the importance of each goal, and indicated the self with which each goal
was linked. Our reasoning was that selves with higher motivational potential would play a more
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pivotal role in the establishment of a desired future. That is, the motivationally primary self
would influence disproportionately future life goals, such that the primary self would be linked
more frequently with goals and would be associated more strongly with important goals. Study 3
also intended to test whether motivational self-primacy is moderated by culture. If the
motivational hierarchy is a product of culture, then the individual self would be most primary in
the US and least primary in China. In the US, future goals would be linked more strongly with
the individual than relational or collective selves, whereas in China future goals would be linked
more strongly with the relational or collective selves than the individual self. On the other hand,
if the motivational primacy of the individual self is pancultural, then both cultures would
manifest individual-self primacy.
The results were consistent with the individual-self primacy view and the pancultural
perspective. Patterns of individual-self-primacy were remarkably consistent across cultures.
Chinese and Americans attributed over twice as many goals to the individual self than the
relational or collective selves. Both Chinese and American participants regarded the most
important goal associated with the individual self as more important than the most important goal
associated with the relational or collective selves. In addition, the weight of the evidence points
to the higher motivational potential of the relational than collective self. Participants attributed
more of their future goals to their relational than collective self, with the exception of American
males who attributed goals equally to those selves. Nonetheless, females and males of both
cultures regarded the most important goal linked with the relational self to be more important
than the most important goal linked with the collective self.
Summary. When it came to expected emotional impact of loss of each self, as well as
the number and importance of goals ascribed to each self, the individual self came on top,
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followed rather narrowly by the relational, which was followed distantly by the collective self. In
addition, this pattern emerged cross-culturally. The proximity of the individual and relational
selves is, perhaps, not surprising, as the two develop in tandem and influence each other greatly
(Cassidy & Shaver, 2008; Crocker, Niiya, & Mischkowski, 2008; Kumashiro & Sedikides, 2005;
Vohs & Finke, 2004). Likewise, evidence suggests that, when the stakes (in terms of esteem or
emotion) are high, the individual self tends to take precedence over the relational self. In
prosocial exchanges between close relationships, the give focuses on the costs of the prosocial
act, whereas the receive focuses on the benefits she or he obtains (Zhang & Epley, 2009).
Persons are more intolerant of personal disequilibrium (i.e., the thwarting of personal goal
pursuits, growth, or exploration) than relational disequilibrium (i.e., the thwarting of a relational
partner’s goal pursuits, personal, or exploration); alternatively, they are more keen to modify
relational than personal dedication (Kumashiro, Rusbult, & Finkel, 2008). Finally, when one
perceives the superior performance of a close other as threatening, one distances the self from
(i.e., one perceived the self as more dissimilar than) the close other in a strategic attempt to
alleviate the threat (O’Mahen, Beach, & Tesser, 2000; Tesser, 1988).
Consideration of Alternatives
Our research suggests that the individual self is at the motivational core of the selfsystem. Our research also suggests that the collective self, albeit important in its own sake, is at
the bottom of the three-tier motivational self-hierarchy. What are some alternative explanations
for these findings?
One such explanation is that the positioning of the collective self is the outcome of the
specific social groups that we used to represent it. However, our findings generalized across
ascribed groups (e.g., gender; Gaertner et al., 1999, Study 1), achieved groups (e.g., university
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affiliation; Gaertner et al., 1999, Study 2), context-dependent groups (e.g., laboratory-formed
ones; Gaertner et al., 1999, Study 3), and idiographically generated most-important groups
(O’Mara et al., 2007). Thus, this alternative is rather questionable.
There is another explanation. Our findings are due to differential level of specificity of
the individual and collective self. Past research (Giladi & Klar, 2002; Klar, 2002; Klar & Giladi,
1997) has shown that singular referents (e.g., a specific group member) are evaluated more
extremely than generalized referents (e.g., the group as a whole). In our research, we
operationalized the individual self as a singular referent and the collective self as a generalized
referent. However, this alternative cannot explain why we obtained the same results pattern
when we operationalized the collective self as a singular referent, that is, in terms of pondering
how negative events might befall a member of the ingroup (O’Mara et al., 2007). In addition,
the singular versus generalized referent account is valid only when the two referents are
evaluated in direct comparison with one another (Giladi & Klar, 2002; Klar, 2002; Klar &
Giladi, 1997). Most of our studies, however, used between-subjects designs, in which
participants experienced threat or flattery of one self but not of another. Thus, the two referents
were not directly compared.
Yet another alternative evokes a social impact theory (Latane, 1981) explanation. Our
findings may be due to a reduced impact of threat or flattery on the collective self, given that this
impact was distributed and diffused across multiple ingroup members. However, we obtained
the same findings for single ingroup members (O’Mara et al., 2007), small and face-to-face
three-person groups (Gaertner et al., 1999, Study3), and very large and anonymous groups
(Gaertner et al., 1999, Study 1).

Hierarchy of the Tripartite Self 19
A final alternative challenges the universality of our findings and confines it to Western
culture. After all, Western culture prescribes norms of independence and uniqueness, whereas
Eastern culture prescribes norms of interdependence and connectedness. This alternative
anticipates the individual self to be primary in the West but tertiary in the East. However, the
empirical evidence is consistent with the idea that the individual self has a strong presence in the
East (Brown, in press; Gaertner, Sedikides, & Chang, 2008; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi,
2003; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005; Yamaguchi et al., 2007). Both in the West and the
East participants give preponderance to the individual self in their self-descriptions (del Prado et
al., 2007; Gaertner et al., 1999, Study 4; Trafimow et al., 1991). In our research (Gaertner et al.,
2010, Study 3), we found that both Chinese and American participants valued the individual self
more than the relational or collective self.
A Theoretical Model
As stated in the introduction of this article, all three selves are vital to the identity of the
person, all three selves are resourceful, and all are linked with psychological and physical health
benefits. In addition, there is evidence that the balance of concerns (e.g., goal pursuit, growth,
exploration) associated with the individual and relational self (Kumashiro et al., 2008) is crucial
for wellness, as is the balanced satisfaction of individual, relational, and collective self needs
(Prilleltensky & Prilleltensky, 2007). The question, though, is how exactly this balance among
the selves is achieved.
We wish to sow the seeds of a theoretical model, the boomerang model, that addresses
this question. The model begins by postulating that the individual self is the experiential home
base. That is, the individual self is both the emotional and the motivational center of the person
(Andersen, Glassman, & Gold, 1998; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1995; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008).
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This relative stable (Bem & Allen, 1974) and self-preserving (Greenwald, 1980) home base
constitutes the essence of the person.
According to the second postulate of the boomerang model, relational partners (Aron,
Aron, & Smollan, 1992) or groups (Smith & Henry, 1996) become relevant to the person only
when they are incorporated into the individual self. Relationships and groups gain in personal
value to the extent that they become psychologically glued to the individual self. Psychological
reduction of close others or groups into the individual self is achieved through expansion (Aron
et al., 1992) or attachment (Cassidy & Shaver, 2008) processes.
The third postulate of the boomerang model is that the person uses this home base as a
springboard for social exploration. The person relies on the individual self as she or he engages
in psychological excursions to the social world, that is to relationships and groups. Stated
otherwise, the person deserts the individual self for the purpose of relational or group activities.
The frequency and duration of these desertions depend on how functional relationships or groups
are for one’s personal concerns. Such functions include the provision of intimacy, social
support, reduction of uncertainty, self-esteem elevation, or practical (e.g., monetary) benefits.
The fourth and final postulate of the boomerang model assumes that the person may
indeed develop strong relational or group ties even to the point of experiencing a fusion between
the individual self and the other selves (Aron et al., 1992; Hogg, 2007; Swann, Gomez, Seyle,
Morales, & Huici, 2009). Yet, the person, while oscillating often between the individual self and
either the relational or collective self, will always return to the home base: the individual self.
The person will boomerang back to the individual self for refuelling in her or his explorative
forays into the social world.
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Arguably, the boomerang model summarizes satisfactorily a good chunk of data on the
three selves. Yet, the model will need to be tested directly. In particular need of empirical
verification is the idea of consistent and persistent boomeranging of the relational or collective
selves back to the individual self.
Concluding Remarks
The individual, relational, and collective selves are both basic forms of self-definition
that contribute crucially to human experience. However, the contribution of the three forms of
self is not equivalent. The motivational structure of the self-concept is arrayed hierarchically and
the individual self has a motivational status elevated above that of the relational and (especially)
collective self. Metaphorically speaking, screams are most distressed and smiles are most
euphoric in response to events that involve the individual self. Our findings have implications
for theory-building. The findings suggest that theories on the link between self and social
perception will do well to base their premises and hypotheses predominantly on the individual
self. This type of self, it appears, sits closer to the motivational core of being human.
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